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COMMENT
WAIVING MIRANDA: A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT APPROACH
Tanner W. Havens
I. INTRODUCTION
Pragmatism is the key to Miranda. The doctrine emanating from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona1 has slowly formed one of
the more convoluted exclusionary rules in American jurisprudence. What on
paper is axiomatic in determining the admissibility of statements made by a
suspect in custody has instead left open a significant question: who can make
a knowing and intelligent waiver? The problems posed by this question are
obviously a concern for suspects who, by reason of their cognitive
impairment, lack the mental capacity to satisfy the standard for a knowing
and intelligent waiver.
Each year, an estimated 695,000 cognitively impaired individuals are
arrested and mirandized2 while arguably suffering the effects of their
respective impairment.3 While a considerable number of individuals
suffering from such a cognitive impairment manifest their inability through
their physical appearance or behavior, a genuine issue arises with those
cognitively impaired suspects who, at the time they are interrogated, appear
lucid and objectively capable of waiving their rights to the investigating
officer, as if they had no impairment at all. If post-hoc fact-finding, primarily
through psychological evaluations, contradicts what an officer plainly
witnessed in the course of an interrogation, a court enjoys broad discretion
in determining whether the waiver was in fact knowing and intelligent.
Addressing the practicality of the question will put at ease the plethora of
literature advocating that cognitively impaired individuals are subject to a
fundamentally unfair criminal justice system.
II. BACKGROUND
Collective scholarship on Miranda is redundant and daunting. It
painstakingly lays out what would otherwise constitute a treatise on a
particularly narrow area of the law. Yet, there remains few areas fertile for
1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Mirandized, a verb, meaning “to recite the Miranda warnings to (a person under arrest).”
Mirandize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Mirandize#h1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
3
Richard Rogers et al., Knowing and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings in Mentally
Disordered Defendants, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 403 (2007).
2
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analysis. The purpose of this section is to apprise the reader of only the
doctrinal information pertinent to the knowing and intelligent prong of a
Miranda waiver. Even in cases where the issue of a knowing and intelligent
waiver goes unanswered or fails to reach meaningful analysis on the merits,
the dicta, rationale, and reasonable inferences are usable to deduce and
articulate the foreseeable jurisprudence on the issue.
A.

Interpreting Miranda: Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent

The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause reads: “No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .”4 The Supreme Court in Miranda extended the Clause to the
custodial interrogation setting.5 In doing so, the Court also summarized the
exclusionary effect of its holding: “[T]he prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”6 Thus, at a
minimum, Miranda mandates (with limited exceptions) that police inform
suspects of their rights and the consequences of relinquishing those rights
before commencing an interrogation.7 These procedural safeguards met a
high volume of criticism for the “substantial cost [imposed] on the societal
interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant
evidence.”8
The specific language required to satisfy the procedural safeguards
mandated by Miranda varies among jurisdictions. Generally, police must
inform a suspect in custody of his or her right to remain silent and right to
the presence of counsel.9 Police must also inform a suspect that any
statements made may be used as evidence against him or her.10
To ensure compliance with the newly implemented procedural safeguards
of Miranda, as well as to avoid suppression of evidence if any of the mandates
were omitted or inaccurately recited, “Miranda Cards” were printed and
distributed to police departments. A Miranda Card for the San Francisco
Police Department reads:
4

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); James J. Tomkovicz, Constitutional Exclusion: The
Rules, Rights, and Remedies that Strike the Balance Between Freedom and Order 108 (2011).
6
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
7
See id.
8
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 448–49 (1976)).
9
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
10
Id.
5
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1.
You have the right to remain silent.
2.
Anything you say can and will be used against you
in a court of law.
3.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him
present with you while you are being questioned.
4.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be
appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you
wish one.
....
1.
Do you understand each of these rights I have
explained to you?
2.
Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to
us now?11
The Miranda Court declared that testimony obtained while failing to comply
with these safeguards renders the evidence inadmissible at trial.12 However,
to ensure that law enforcement was not unduly hindered from pursuing
legitimate government interests, the Court provided that a suspect may waive
these rights. With limited exceptions, such a waiver is valid if it “is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”13
Additionally, the Court placed a “heavy burden” on the government to
prove that statements made outside the presence of an attorney were
knowing and intelligent.14 Presuming that a suspect in custody will in fact
exercise her constitutional rights,15 the burden borne by the government is to
prove that the waiver was made “fairly and [with] full knowledge of the
consequences.”16 The primary justification for imposing this heavy burden is
based on the Court’s precedent pertaining to waivers of similar constitutional
rights.17 Imposition of this burden was further justified by the inherently
coercive nature of the custodial interrogation setting; that is, the “isolated
circumstances” in which the interrogation takes place, as well as the
government possessing the most corroborative, if not the only, evidence of
administering the warnings.18
11

Fred P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound 138 (1970).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; TOMKOVICZ, supra note 5, at 108.
13
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
14
Id. at 475.
15
42 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 10 (1997).
16
Id.; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (noting circumstances that do not support a
presumption of waiver).
17
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
18
Id.
12
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Time has shown that this “heavy burden” of proof was merely nominal:
the government need only prove a waiver by a preponderance of the
evidence.19 Justification for this standard, rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, rests on multiple considerations. First, the validity of a
waiver bears no relation to the elements of the crime alleged; that is, it bears
no relation to whether a jury verdict is reliable.20 Second, the Court has relied
on precedent in holding the burden of proving the voluntariness of a
confession to the same standard.21 Third, the burden of proof satisfactorily
safeguards the values that the rule is intended to protect, while still fulfilling
the ultimate purpose of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent for coercive police
misconduct.22 Lastly, and ultimately, the evidentiary rules of each jurisdiction
are better equipped to necessitate a more stringent burden of proof, rather
than the Due Process Clause, if necessary.23
Although the Miranda Court failed to define what constitutes a “knowing
and intelligent” waiver, it implicitly required that a suspect’s mental capacity
be considered in reaching a judgment.24 The requisite inquisition into the
faculties of a suspect’s mind is further bolstered by the fact that knowledge
and intelligence are inherently a product of mental functionality.25 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Clark foresaw the inevitable difficulties in
analyzing whether a waiver satisfies the knowing and intelligent prong:
The line between proper and permissible police conduct and
techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best,
a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this
where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect
of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on

19

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168.
Id.; Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972).
21
Lego, 404 U.S. at 484.
22
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169 (“[Exclusionary] rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless
conduct by police and prosecution and it is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution's
burden of proof in . . . suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect
to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of
arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.” (alterations in original) (quoting
Lego, 404 U.S. at 489)).
23
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
24
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492 (“The mere fact that [a suspect] signed a statement . . . stating
that he had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing and
intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.”).
25
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166–67 (hinting at the difficulty inherent in conducting “sweeping
inquiries” into a suspect’s mind, absent police coercion).
20
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the mind and will of an accused . . . .26
This difficult distinction is still a polarizing complexity among inferior
federal and state courts seeking guidance in determining whether a suspect’s
waiver was knowing and intelligent.
B.

Applying Miranda: Voluntary, (and) Knowing and Intelligent

Like it has done for the waiver of other constitutional guarantees, the
Court has bisected the necessary requirements for a valid waiver under
Miranda.27 The validity of a waiver is not to be analyzed under the guise of
Miranda’s prescribed adverbial triplet; rather, a waiver’s validity requires
analyses of “two distinct dimensions,” such that it must be both voluntary,
and knowing and intelligent.28
A suspect’s waiver is voluntary if it is the “product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”29 The Court has had
little difficulty in applying this standard in the confession context: “In thirtysix opinions the Supreme Court . . . decided, on the basis of the ‘totality of the
circumstances,’ that some confessions had been ‘the offspring of a reasoned
choice,’ and that others had been products of ‘a will overborne.’”30 For a
suspect’s waiver to be sufficiently knowing and intelligent, the Court
articulated in Moran v. Burbine:
[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness of
both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the
“totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the
requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.31
Since Moran, the Court has continued to emphasize the bisectional nature
of the two prongs, requiring that both satisfy the necessary standards of the
doctrine before statements made following waiver are admissible at trial.

26

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 502 (Clark, J., concurring in part) (quoting Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963)); accord Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938).
27
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
28
E.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–83 (2010) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).
29
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
30
GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 161 (emphasis added).
31
Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
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Justifying Miranda: The Constitution or Prophylaxis?

In addition to the standard prescribed by the Court, it is necessary to
address the foundations of the rule in constitutional jurisprudence. In the
summer of 1968, approximately two years after the Miranda decision,
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as an apparent measure to overrule the
judicially-prescribed mandates under the Fifth Amendment.32 In Dickerson
v. United States, the Court changed course and affirmatively declared that the
requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver is a
constitutional rule, incapable of usurpation by legislative enactment.33 The
Dickerson Court declined to overrule Miranda and thus, held that § 3501 was
unconstitutional.34
Under § 3501(a), a suspect’s confession was admissible in a federal
criminal prosecution if the trial judge merely determined that it was
voluntarily made, regardless of whether the police employed the Miranda
procedural safeguards.35 While appearing to effectively nullify Miranda’s
knowing and intelligent prong, the circumstances prescribed by § 3501(b) to
be considered by a trial judge in determining voluntariness included factors
relating to the suspect’s mental ability:
[I]n determining . . . voluntariness [the judge] shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving
of the confession, including . . . whether or not such
defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to
make any statement and that any such statement could be
used against him, . . . [and] whether or not such defendant
had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the
assistance of counsel . . .36
However, as made plain by the Court’s decision, these considerations were
inadequate to an interpretation of the knowing and intelligent prong,
“essentially return[ing] interrogation procedures to the pre-Miranda era.”37
Under § 3501(b), a trial judge could take into consideration whether a

32

ALAN M. GOLDSTEIN & NAOMI E. SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE
MIRANDA RIGHTS 32–33 (2010); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501, invalidated by Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
33
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (2000).
34
Id.
35
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (“[A] confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given.”); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 33.
36
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 33.
37
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 33.
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suspect was advised of or knew he had a right to remain silent, but only
whether he had been advised of the right to have an attorney present without
considering whether the suspect “knew” that right was guaranteed.38
Arguably, these factors lend credence to a belief that the knowing and
intelligent requirement of Miranda was incorporated into the statute.
However, because of the absence of any definition of “knew,” these factors
were disparaging to the standard for a knowing and intelligent waiver, and
additionally, they were merely factors to be considered. At least one other
federal Circuit argued to no avail the unconstitutionality of the statute’s
usurpation of Miranda, claiming that “§ 3501 allows greater discretion in the
trial court in determining the issue of voluntariness and thus the admissibility
of a confession than the principles of Miranda which are constitutionally
mandated to satisfy the commands of the Fifth Amendment.”39 Thus, the
judicially-prescribed requirement that procedural safeguards be employed,
and that a waiver must be knowing and intelligent before a suspect’s custodial
testimony is admissible at trial, was free for any federal judge to discount or
disregard.
Despite a prior upholding of § 3501 in the federal circuit and consistent
with principles of stare decisis, the Dickerson Court elected not to overrule
Miranda and held that § 3501 was unconstitutional.40 The Court reasoned
that Miranda, while not immutable, was a constitutional decision, and that
its mandates had become so embedded in the national culture that there was
adequate reason not to overrule it.41 Additionally, and notably absent from
the decision, was the fact that the government avoided invoking § 3501 in
most federal criminal cases, appearing to have acknowledged the impropriety
and potential unconstitutionality of the statute.42
Regardless of critics’ position on the foundations of the Miranda decision,
they are hard pressed to argue against the justifications for stare decisis in this
instance, considering the embedment of Miranda’s procedural safeguards
into the minds of Americans through recitation in multiple popular

38

See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir. 1975), abrogated by United States
v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 516 (2000).
40
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
41
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
42
“In fact, with limited exceptions . . . [§ 3501] has been studiously avoided by every
Administration, not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since its enactment more than
25 years ago.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
LAW OF PRE–TRIAL INTERROGATION 72–73 (1986)).
39

340

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:3

television programs.43 Thus, the Court held that the voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent requirements, as mandated by Miranda, were necessary for the
admission of statements into evidence in order to fully comport with the
Constitution.
D.

Colorado v. Connelly

While predating the Dickerson decision by fourteen years, the Connelly
opinion is the genesis of the jurisdictional split pertaining to the knowing and
intelligent prong.44 The two prongs of analyzing a Miranda waiver’s validity,
while beneficial to suspects yearning for the most protection the law can
afford, are the source of the confusion stemming from this case. Despite what
appears to be axiomatic from the plain language of the opinion, the
requirement that a waiver be both voluntary, and knowing and intelligent,
has since been muddled by inferior federal and state courts’ interpretations
of the Connelly decision.
Francis Connelly suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia; a
“longstanding severe mental disorder.”45 After traveling from Massachusetts
to Colorado, Connelly approached a uniformed police officer and confessed
to the 1982 murder of a Denver woman.46 At the time of his confession,
Connelly stated that he understood his rights and appeared (to the officer)
capable of “understand[ing] fully the nature of his acts.”47 Police verified that
a woman had in fact gone missing around the timeframe posed in Connelly’s
confession, leading additional officers to investigate the site at which
Connelly claimed to have committed the murder.48 During this time,
Connelly’s ability to understand the situation he placed himself in remained
apparent to the investigative officers.49
At trial, Connelly moved to suppress his statements to the police officer

43

Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of Law and the Rise of Control of Executive Power, 18 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 303, 326 n.108 (2014) (“The television series Law and Order . . . comment[ed]
on both the quality of the American justice system as well as the meaning and application of
justice and the rule of law . . .”); Ronald Steiner et. al., The Rise and Fall of the Miranda
Warnings in Popular Culture, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 224 (2011) (noting that television
shows like Dragnet and Law & Order “made Miranda warnings part of popular culture,
which seems to have saved them from a potential elimination.").
44
See generally Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
45
Id. at 174 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
46
Id. at 160 (majority opinion).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 160–61.
49
Id. at 161 (“Detective Antuna perceived no indication whatsoever that [Connelly] was
suffering from any kind of mental illness.”).
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regarding the murder.50 He claimed that his confession was involuntary
because it was compelled by the “voice of God.”51 The trial court granted the
motion, holding that Connelly’s statements were involuntary due to the
impairment of Connelly’s volition as a result of his schizophrenia and giving
credence to the government-appointed psychologist’s determination that
“Connelly’s psychosis motivated his confession.”52 The Supreme Court of
Colorado affirmed the trial court’s holding, reasoning that the voluntariness
of a statement is ultimately determined by whether it was the product of
rational intellect and free will.53
The Supreme Court granted the State of Colorado’s petition for certiorari,
particularly due to its disagreement with how the Supreme Court of Colorado
analyzed the voluntariness issue.54 The Court stated that the Supreme Court
of Colorado erred by incorporating notions of “free will” into its analysis.55
To the displeasure of those advocating for greater protection of cognitivelyimpaired suspects who waive their Miranda rights, the Court also
reemphasized that an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination is “not
concerned ‘with moral and psychological pressures emanating from sources
other than official coercion.’”56
The Court affirmatively set forth the limits of protection afforded by the
Self-Incrimination Clause in a clear attempt to cabin the highly criticized
prophylactic rule of Miranda.57 The Court held that police coercion was a
necessary predicate to deeming a waiver involuntary within the context of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 To emphasize that
the decision applied only to the voluntary prong of an effective waiver, the
majority stated in a footnote:
It is possible to read the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Colorado as finding respondent's Miranda waiver invalid on
other grounds. Even if that is the case, however, we
nonetheless reverse the judgment in its entirety because of
our belief that the Supreme Court of Colorado's analysis was
50

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161.
Id.
52
Id. at 162.
53
People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985), rev’d, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157 (1986).
54
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 171 n.4.
55
Id. at 169.
56
Id. at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)).
57
Id. at 169–71.
58
Id. at 167.
51
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influenced by its mistaken view of “voluntariness” in the
constitutional sense. Reconsideration of other issues, not
inconsistent with our opinion, is of course open to the
Supreme Court of Colorado on remand.59
Despite what appears to be an unambiguous statement by the Court that
its holding applies only to the voluntary prong of analysis, this disclosure in
a mere footnote and the totality of the decision are the primary cause of
confusion among the inferior federal and state courts as to the fate of the
knowing and intelligent prong.
III. THE UNKNOWING PROBLEM
The perpetual tension between legitimate government interests and
individual liberty is demonstrated through an analysis of the knowing and
intelligent prong.60 There are certainly instances in which a defendant’s
characteristics, viewed objectively through the perspective of an
interrogating officer, reveal that the defendant lacks the required ability to
comprehend. However, these competing interests clash most forcefully in
instances where an interrogating officer employs due diligence to apprise a
suspect of his Miranda rights and objectively determines, based on the
defendant’s manifested characteristics, that he possesses the mental capacity
to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. In these instances, the police have
exercised good faith in obtaining what would otherwise be admissible
testimony; however, the suspect’s alleged incapacity to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver suggests that there is some exercise of undue influence over
the suspect’s will. The link between the interrogating officer’s behavior and
the suspect’s incapacity to comprehend is tenable at best. This due diligence
is expressed through explaining the Miranda rights (and repeating the
rights), providing the terms of waiver in writing, and providing the terms of
waiver in a non-English language. How is the law to be shaped when there is
no unconstitutional conduct to deter and evidence of mental incapacity is
highly limited to post-hoc psychological evaluation?
Literature discussing Connelly and its progeny of related cases justifiably
articulates why it is unfair for the government to use self-incriminating
statements from cognitively impaired suspects and how admission of these

59

Id. at 171 n.4.
E.g., Collins v. Gaetz, 612 F.3d 574, 590 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The Miranda warnings represent
a balance between the desire to obtain truthful confessions and the desire to protect some of
our most fundamental rights.”).
60
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statements poses a substantial threat of incarcerating innocent individuals.61
However, these authors fail to see the two sides of the coin. The government
has an interest in using legitimate law enforcement techniques to garner
evidence from those suspected of committing crime, typically in the form of
written or oral statements of culpability.62 As the Supreme Court noted:
“Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt
by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable.”63
On the other end of the spectrum, the fact that an individual may be
subjected to an indefinite period of incarceration due to a psychological
impulse to confess implicates concerns of personal liberty. And, of course,
there is always the overarching public policy concern that the government
should not take advantage of the cognitively impaired in its administration
of the law.64 How willing is the government to disregard a suspect’s mental
capacity in determining guilt or innocence?
Here are the two sides of the jurisdictional split regarding the knowing and
intelligent prong: some courts hold that police coercion is a necessary
predicate to finding a waiver invalid; other courts hold that police coercion
is a necessary predicate only to finding a waiver involuntary (i.e., police
coercion is not necessary to find the waiver was not knowing or intelligent).
The former read Connelly to allow legitimate law enforcement practices by
deeming a waiver knowing and intelligent based on an objective analysis of
an investigating officer’s perception of the suspect.65 Those jurisdictions hold
that a waiver is invalid only if there are indicia of police coercion present,
with some explicitly giving primary significance to law enforcement
observations of the interrogation. The latter advocate the value and necessity
of the defendant’s individual characteristics in determining whether the
61

See generally Morgan Cloud et. al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002); Brian Corcoran,
Note, "This Has to Be Wrong": Mirandizing the Mentally Challenged, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 629 (2008); Noel Moran, Confessions Compelled by Mental Illness: What's an Insane
Person to Do?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1049 (1988); Michael R. Pace, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments–Defining the Protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Against
Self-Incrimination for the Mentally Impaired, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 877 (1988);
Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, but Knowing and Intelligent? Comprehension in Mental
Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 605 (2005); Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for
Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243 (2004).
62
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166.
63
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
64
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
65
Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 262, 262 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rice v. Cooper,
148 F.3d 747, 750–751 (7th Cir. 1998)); see Woodley v. Bradshaw, 451 F. App’x 529, 540 (6th
Cir. 2011).
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totality of the circumstances objectively reveal a knowing and intelligent
waiver.66 Those jurisdictions utilize the totality of the circumstances test
applied to involuntary confessions and analyze a suspect’s mental ability as a
factor apart from an officer’s conduct and observations.67 Ultimately, the
inferior federal and state courts hold that police coercion is either (1) a
necessary predicate to deeming a waiver involuntary; or (2) a necessary
predicate to deeming a waiver invalid.68
A.

Who Can Make a Knowing and Intelligent Waiver?

Of the 695,000 cognitively impaired individuals that are arrested each
year, it is reasonable to assume that at least some are mirandized while
suffering the effects of their respective impairment.69 While this Comment
will focus primarily on those suspects who are subject to psychotic disorders,
the rationale is applicable to all cognitive impairments, such as intellectual
disability, adolescence, low IQ, and language comprehension.
To understand the problem that has led to the split, it is important to
explain why a cognitively impaired individual who fails to manifest any
indicia of impairment cannot meet the legal standard for a knowing and
intelligent waiver as prescribed by the Court:
[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness of
both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the
“totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the
requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.70
On its face, one could draw a conclusion that most, if not all, suspects
suffering from cognitive impairments are incapable of achieving full
awareness as to the nature of the right or the consequences of its
relinquishment. However, intellectually disabled, low IQ, and non-English
speaking suspects have been found capable of waiving these rights. Based on
66
United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 298, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also United States
v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2002).
67
Woodley, 451 F. App'x at 540.
68
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“We hold that coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
69
Rogers et al., supra note 3, at 403.
70
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725
(1979)).
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this, what is the “requisite level of comprehension”? Does it necessarily vary
from individual to individual? Is there a legal standard that provides
uniformity in the Miranda waiver context? Based on lower court decisions,
it appears that the “requisite level of comprehension” standard varies based
on each court’s totality of the circumstances analysis. However, because
comprehension is arguably different among individuals, this inquiry yields
inapposite results. This Comment will propose to remedy this inadequacy.
For a cognitively-impaired individual—or any individual for that matter—
to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, she must have full awareness
of the nature underlying the right to remain silent and the right to have an
attorney present during the interrogation.71 She must be fully aware of the
consequences of relinquishing those rights in favor of speaking with police
outside the presence of an attorney.72 Yet, it is not required that a suspect be
informed of every consequence that may result from waiving the right to
remain silent or the right to counsel.73
The Court has long bifurcated the elements into a requirement that a
waiver be (1) voluntary, and (2) knowing and intelligent; and proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.74 However, some scholars assert that the
requirements of a valid waiver are apportioned into triplets,75 analogizing the
distinction between “knowing” and “intelligent” to the distinction between a
factual and rational understanding in determining a criminal defendant’s
competency to stand trial.76
Whether viewed as two prongs or three, the essence of a knowing waiver
is the suspect's ability to understand the nature of the rights possessed, as well
as the manner in which he is apprised of those rights.77 Whether a waiver is
made knowingly “depends both on the suspect’s ability to know or
understand what each of the four Miranda rights mean and the way in which
the rights were presented to him.”78 The manner in which the suspect is
apprised of his rights provides bountiful opportunity for coercion.79 Thus,
71

See id.
See id.
73
E.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987).
74
See supra Section II.B.
75
I. Bruce Frumkin & Alfredo Garcia, Psychological Evaluations and the Competency to
Waive Miranda Rights, 27 CHAMPION 12, 13–14 (2003); see generally THOMAS GRISSO,
EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 2003).
76
Frumkin & Garcia, supra note 75, at 14.
77
Id. at 13.
78
Id.
79
See United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012); Clay v. State, 725 S.E.2d 260
(Ga. 2012); Commonwealth v. Lukach, 163 A.3d 1003 (Pa. 2017).
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the suspect’s ability to understand is not wholly independent of the officer’s
conduct.
An intelligent waiver “requires the suspect to be able to weigh his options
and their consequences, thereby exhibiting the capacity to make a decision.”80
When viewed as its own peculiar requirement, an intelligent waiver implies
that the suspect makes a rational choice based on an appreciation of the
contingent consequences surrounding the decision.81 This, however, is
wholly independent of the police’s conduct.
In the context of forensic mental health, the legal requirement of
“knowing” is analogous to “understanding,” while “intelligent” is analogous
to “appreciation.”82 Essentially, the question posited when a suspect fails to
manifest any indicia of cognitive impairment is whether he understood the
procedural safeguards in the manner in which they were presented and
whether he was able to apply those safeguards to his own situation, thereby
“grasp[ing] the potential consequences of waiving those rights.”83 These
formulations are at odds with the Court’s explicit holding that a suspect does
not need to understand all of the consequences of his waiver in order to effect
a valid one.84 It also conflicts with the consistently affirmed position of the
Supreme Court noted above: “The waiver inquiry ‘has two distinct
dimensions.’”85
Compared to most other persons suffering from prevalent mental
disorders in the United States, paranoid schizophrenics are significantly
more impaired in their cognitive functions.86 In regard to adjudicative
competence, which is analogous to an individual’s capacity to waive his
rights, 72% of paranoid schizophrenics are typically considered “impaired,”
while only 25% of individuals suffering from other mental disorders are
considered “impaired.”87 In an evaluation of understanding, reasoning, and
appreciation, only 48.1% of all schizophrenics performed adequately, in
comparison to 76.1% of those suffering from depression.88 Comprehension
ability among individuals of average intelligence is additionally relevant.
Research reveals that even 45% of functioning members of society conduct
80

Frumkin & Garcia, supra note 75, at 14.
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GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 41.
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Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987).
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themselves in the custodial context under the false notion that oral
statements cannot be used against them.89
B.

Coercion is a Necessary Predicate to Deeming a Waiver Invalid

This section will present two cases which found a suspect’s waiver valid
despite evidence of diminished mental capacity. In both cases, and others
whose citation would be cumulative, the suspect’s mental capacity is alleged
in some effect to have altered his ability to make a knowing and intelligent
waiver. However, the absence of police coercion causes each court to reach
outside doctrinal mandates and inquire pragmatically into the purposes
underlying Miranda.
1.

Rice v. Cooper

This case arose in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit twelve years after the Connelly decision and has served as persuasive
authority for other jurisdictions.90 The decision is also notorious for what
appeared to be a my-hands-are-tied approach by Judge Richard Posner.91
Gerald Rice was an illiterate, “mildly retarded” sixteen-year-old man with
atypical depression.92 Rice hurled a bottle of gasoline inside an apartment
building, killing four residents, and was subsequently convicted of firstdegree murder and sentenced to life in prison.93 Rice was arrested a short time
after the detonation and subject to questioning on three separate occasions.94
On all three occasions, Rice was read his Miranda rights by the investigating
officer and indicated that he understood the rights as given.95 Despite Rice’s
contention that physical force was used against him in order to obtain the
confession, the trial court found that this was not in fact the case.96
Post-hoc psychological evaluations performed by two clinical
psychologists provided testimony that Rice was mentally incompetent at the
time he waived his rights but was nonetheless competent to stand trial.97
89

Frumkin & Garcia, supra note 75, at 14.
See generally Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998).
91
See generally Corcoran, supra note 61, at 639–45 (discussing the policy implications of the
Rice decision).
92
Rice, 148 F.3d at 749. Atypical depression means “a depressive episode with atypical
features.” Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM–IV) 386 (4th ed. 1994)).
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Id.
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People v. Rice, 628 N.E.2d 837, 838–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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Id.
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Id. at 842–43.
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Rice, 148 F.3d at 749–50.
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Police testimony proffered that at the time of Rice’s interrogation, there was
nothing that would give rise to an inference that Rice lacked the mental
capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver.98 However, the record
reflected that at the time the police provided Rice his Miranda rights, Rice
sought clarification as to the meaning of certain recitations.99 With all of this
evidence, the Seventh Circuit was left to determine “the duty, if any, of the
police to protect a mentally impaired person from incriminating himself.”100
Despite psychological expert testimony regarding Rice’s mental capacity,
the court held that Rice validly waived his Miranda rights.101 The court
reasoned that there was no evidence of police abuse nor compelling evidence
of his mental incapacity.102 However, it is unclear which of these reasons—
the absence of abuse or the uncompelling testimony—provided the greatest
force in concluding that Rice’s waiver was valid.103
Judge Posner opined at length about the court’s inability to meaningfully
discern when a Miranda waiver is invalid in the absence of police coercion.104
Thinking aloud, he wrote:
Maybe the real difference between the two cases is that
judges are more confident about being able to determine
whether a suspect understands the Miranda warnings than
about being able to determine whether he waived them
because he was remorseful, calculating, or merely impulsive,
on the one hand, or mentally ill or deficient on the other.105
Judge Posner expressed his disbelief in his own opinion: “[T]his has to be
wrong, though we cannot find a case that says so.”106 Opponents of the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Connelly claim that it rendered the
protections afforded by Miranda meaningless to individuals who are
undetectably impaired by mental disorders during custodial
interrogations.107 While there are other citable cases that illustrate the tension
98

Id. at 751.
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between the competing interests and favor the approach of the Seventh
Circuit, the Rice decision is succinctly adequate to pose the main points of
argument.
2.

Garner v. Mitchell

A more recent case in which the absence of police coercion led to finding
a valid waiver, despite evidence of the suspect’s diminished mental capacity,
arose in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 2009.
Among other charges, William Garner was convicted of five counts of
aggravated murder after burglarizing an apartment and setting it ablaze with
five children sleeping inside.108 The taxi-cab driver who drove Garner from
the arson site to his residence provided evidence of Garner’s identity as the
perpetrator, facilitating the police’s search of Garner’s apartment and
subsequent arrest.109 The police read Garner his Miranda rights at the time of
arrest and a second time upon arrival at the precinct.110 Garner agreed to
waive his Miranda rights by an express waiver and provided a taped
statement of the events leading up to the crime.111
The Sixth Circuit held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Garner
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.112 The court
looked specifically to the manner in which police apprised Garner of his
rights, as well as to his fluent response in waiving those rights.113 At the time
of the interrogation, police reached the conclusion that Garner appeared
“perfectly normal” and “very coherent.”114 Each time an officer recited one of
the procedural safeguards afforded to Garner, the police exercised their due
diligence by confirming that Garner understood the right as provided.115
Garner’s response in the affirmative was sufficient to dissuade any belief that
he lacked the requisite mental capacity in comport with the standards set out
in Miranda.116
The court particularly noted that Garner’s ability to understand the
consequences of his actions in his custodial statements were indicative of his
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Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 258 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Garner, 557 F.3d at 261.
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Id.
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ability to understand the consequences of waiving his rights.117 Expert
testimony offered at trial indicated that Garner appeared capable of
understanding the implications of waiving his Miranda rights at the time of
interrogation.118 Relying on the Rice opinion, the court opined that even if
the record reflected an inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver,
the officer’s inability to detect such incapacity and the deterrent rationale of
Miranda precluded a contrary holding.119
The court hammered down on this rationale:
At no point did the Supreme Court say that one of the two
dimensions is to be examined from the perspective of the
police while the other is to be examined from the perspective
of later scientific inquiry. Instead, both are to be evaluated
from the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.”120
The absence of any manifestation from Garner that would cause the
interrogating officers to conclude that he lacked the requisite mental capacity
to waive his rights, coupled with the officer’s diligence in obtaining Garner’s
waiver consistent with the principles outlined in Miranda, led the court to
ultimately conclude that there was no basis on which it could invalidate
Garner’s waiver.121
C.

Police Coercion is a Necessary Predicate to Deeming a Waiver
Involuntary

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
took an alternative approach in United States v. Bradshaw.122 The defendant,
Larry Bradshaw, had a detailed history of bank robberies and mental
illness.123 Bradshaw was diagnosed as a schizophrenic more than fifteen years
before the bank robbery that led to his arrest.124 While fleeing from the scene
of this heist, the money-bag’s dye pack exploded; Bradshaw was arrested,
117

Id. (“We have held, in the similar context of a challenge to the voluntariness of a
confession, that a defendant's capacity to devise a criminal scheme was evidence of capacity
to admit to devising the scheme.” (citing United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 952 (6th
Cir. 1990))).
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interrogated, and ultimately confessed.125
Bradshaw’s counsel moved to suppress the confession, arguing that
because of his mental illness and the excessive quantity of alcohol he
consumed before the robbery, he was unable to understand his rights or the
consequences of relinquishing them.126 The district court, however, denied
the motion to suppress, adjudicating on the assumption that police coercion
was a necessary predicate to deeming a waiver invalid.127
The appellate court held that the district court erred in denying the motion
to suppress Bradshaw’s confession.128 The court reasoned that the district
court’s failure to make any explicit findings as to Bradshaw’s capacity to
understand was the result of an incorrect interpretation of the holding in
Connelly.129 The court spoke on Connelly at length, noting its distinctions
from the facts of the case at hand and emphasizing that the principal
argument in Connelly’s case was that his waiver was involuntary, not that it
was unknowing and unintelligent.130 Additionally, the court noted that only
Connelly’s volitional abilities were impaired by his schizophrenia and that
his cognitive functions were not significantly impaired.131
In rationalizing the Connelly Court’s explicit restriction of its holding to
the voluntary prong, the court articulated what similarly situated
jurisdictions have come to adopt as an analysis of the knowing and intelligent
prong:
We read Connelly . . . as holding only that police coercion
is a necessary prerequisite to a determination that a waiver
was involuntary and not as bearing on the separate question
whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. Connelly's
claims, as noted above, were clearly directed only towards
the voluntariness of his actions; the knowledge test was not
involved in the case. And there is no other way to explain the
Supreme Court's disclaimer: aside from the knowledge
inquiry, there are no “other grounds” on which the lower
court's ruling could have been based . . .132
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Analysis of whether Bradshaw’s waiver was knowing and intelligent under
this standard would have supplied valuable authority for other jurisdictions
contemplating the issue. However, because there were no findings of fact
pertaining to Bradshaw’s ability to understand, the court was limited to
remanding the case for further findings, rather than definitively determining
the knowing and intelligent issue for the circuit.133
D.

Conclusion

The crux of the problem is the difficulty in distinguishing a suspect’s
irresistible impulse to confess from a suspect confessing due to an inability to
understand his right to not confess. Cognitively impaired suspects, who do
not outwardly manifest indicia of their inability to understand, face the
greatest consequences of this problem. However, as this Comment will
demonstrate below, a standard consistent with Rice and Garner does not
diminish a cognitively impaired individual’s protections in the absence of
police coercion.
IV. THE INTELLIGENT APPROACH
Some jurisdictions read Connelly to mean that when a waiver is contested,
there must be some evidence of police coercion in order to find the waiver
invalid. On the other end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions read Connelly
as applying only to the voluntariness of a waiver and admonish lower courts
who fail to consider individualized evidence of the suspect’s capacity to
comprehend the warnings. The results reached by the respective jurisdictions
are not so incongruent as to warrant preference for one or the other. But
explication of both lends credence to implementation of a new rule governing
such instances of waiver.
As a preface, there are necessary concessions. The plain language in the
Connelly decision reflects that the voluntariness prong was the primary issue
addressed without offering meaningful analysis on the knowing and
intelligent prong. There is nothing in the opinion that could be interpreted
textually as directing lower courts to invalidate a waiver only if police
coercion is present. In theory, the two-prong analysis has been the
cornerstone of Miranda waiver jurisprudence for the last thirty-five years,
and an interpretation aligned with that of Judge Posner (in theory) could
render the knowing and intelligent prong superfluous.134
133
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However, the context surrounding the voluntariness issue in Connelly (i.e.,
Connelly confessed while suffering under a schizophrenic episode) is not
insignificant in advocating this Comment’s contrary interpretation, like that
of the Seventh Circuit, that coercion is necessary to prove a waiver invalid in
its totality. Cognitively impaired suspects who do not outwardly manifest
indicia of their inability to comprehend face the greatest consequences of this
problem. The crux of the problem is distinguishing between a suspect’s
irresistible impulse to confess and a suspect confessing due to an inability to
understand his right to not confess when that inability is unapparent to the
interrogating officer.
Considering precedent, the purposes of Miranda, and the necessity of
encouraging effective and legitimate law enforcement, an interpretation of
Connelly more aligned with that of the Seventh Circuit is more logically and
utilitarianly sound. Additionally, a cognitively impaired suspect who
allegedly made an unknowing and unintelligent waiver is not deprived of the
same level of protection. Coercive police misconduct should be necessary to
invalidate a waiver of Miranda rights for three reasons: the fact that the
Constitution shields only infringing government action, the original
justification for the Miranda rule, and the effect that a contrary holding
would have on legitimate law enforcement operations.
A.

The Unknowing Suspect: Ted’s Case

For practical reference of this Comment’s proposal, consider the following
scenario: Ted is brought in for questioning after his girlfriend, Carol, is found
dead at a local lagoon. Officer Sue reads Ted his Miranda rights and asks Ted
if he understands each, to which he responds in the affirmative. Officer Sue
provides, and Ted signs, a written waiver of his Miranda rights. There is
nothing at this moment that would lead Officer Sue to believe that Ted lacked
the capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. He heard
Officer Sue state the warnings, confirmed that he understood them as
presented, and further, signed a written waiver as affirmance to his stance to
waive his rights.
Officer Sue asks Ted whether he knows who is responsible for the death of
Carol, to which Ted blurts out, “I did it! I killed Carol!” Officer Sue inquires
further, asking for details, to which Ted responds, “I stabbed her with a knife
at the local lagoon.” Seeking clarification of details pertaining to motive,
Officer Sue inquires further, and Ted begins to justify his act by stating that
the voices in his head compelled him to do it; that it was a necessary act in his

(emphasis added)). See supra Section III.C (discussion of courts finding police coercion as a
necessary predicate to deeming a waiver invalid).
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progression to enlightenment. Sensing a disconnect from reality, Officer Sue
asks if Ted would like to have an attorney present, to which he responds in
the affirmative. Officer Sue ceases questioning.
A knife with Carol’s blood is found at the local lagoon, and a search
warrant is executed at Ted’s residence. The knife is a missing part of a kitchen
set inside Ted’s residence. Ted is arrested and charged with first-degree
murder in the killing of Carol. At trial, defense counsel moves to suppress
Ted’s statements made while in custody, arguing that his waiver was not
made knowingly and intelligently. Dr. Toboggan, an accredited clinical
psychologist, diagnoses Ted with paranoid schizophrenia and prescribes him
the appropriate medication to aid in his treatment. Ted had not previously
been diagnosed with schizophrenia or any other mental disorder, nor had he
been given any mental health treatment or medication.
In light of the medication prescribed to Ted, the trial court determines he
is competent to stand trial. However, Dr. Toboggan testifies that it was highly
probable that, at the time of the interrogation, Ted was in a psychotic state
and suffering from severe delusions and paranoia. The prosecution’s medical
expert confirms that Ted’s behavior was unusual but disagrees with Dr.
Toboggan's determination that Ted was suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia at the time of the interrogation.
Faced with the motion to suppress in a jurisdiction that has yet to take a
definitive stance on the issue, the trial court judge will analyze and consider
the following authorities of this section to reach the ultimate conclusion that
the motion to suppress Ted’s statements should be denied.
B.

Looking to the Constitution: What Triggers Protection?

For better or for worse, the Constitution serves as the initial authority of
inquiry into the question posed.135 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”136 Miranda unambiguously served as a prophylactic
extension of this protection to the custodial interrogation setting.137 In the
immediate aftermath and still today, the reasons justifying cynicism toward
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the decision are bountiful.138 However, the Court’s holding in Dickerson
necessarily requires looking to the proverbial text.139
1.

The Police

Analysis of the voluntary prong requires a delving inquiry into the
fundamental principles rooted in the Constitution. Absent from Magna
Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights, the privilege against selfincrimination is primarily derived from the persecution of Puritans during
the reign of Charles I.140 During this period, the Court of High Commission
and the Court of Star Chamber were concerned with religious and political
subversion, respectively.141 These courts “pry[ed] into men’s minds since they
were largely concerned with dangerous thoughts.”142 Justifiably, this practice
warranted the inclusion of the privilege into the Constitution, as the
involuntary nature of Charles I’s special prerogative courts were largely at
odds with principles of fundamental fairness.143
However, an analysis of this period fails to sufficiently address the
knowing and intelligent requirement mandated by the Miranda Court. This
is a primary reason the knowing and intelligent prong fails to receive equally
meaningful attention as the voluntary prong, not so much by reason of
judicial failure to conduct such an inquiry, but rather, the absence of
justification yielded from such an inquiry.
The Constitution in large part serves as a guarantee of individual liberty
from government intrusion. Thus, invoking the Constitution as a defender
of these guarantees requires some act to be committed by the government or
one acting in concert with the government.144 Bouvier Law Dictionary
succinctly summarizes what constitutes state action:
An action by, for, with, or under the protection of state
law or officials. State action is an action that deprives a
person of a federally protected right because of some
138
E.g., GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 158–60; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 622 (1996).
139
See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (declining to overrule
Miranda on bases of stare decisis).
140
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Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,
is action taken 'under color of' state law." (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941))).
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relationship between the action and the state. The element
of state responsibility or involvement or authorization of the
act makes the act state action. In the absence of a state
relationship to an act that harms a person, the person might
have a private cause of action but no constitutional claim,
because the Constitution, or at least the Fourteenth
Amendment, has been interpreted to apply to state action
and not to private, or non-state, action.145
A suspect in custody must be able to point to an action of the state that
deprived him of his privilege against self-incrimination. Particularly, he must
prove the state’s responsibility, involvement, or authorization as the source
of such deprivation.146 In the context of whether a waiver is voluntary, this
necessitates the presence of police coercion. But in the context of whether a
waiver is knowing and intelligent, it is harder to find what quantifiable
responsibility or involvement the police have in the psychological forces
steering a suspect’s compulsion to confess or produce statements of
culpability.
In every interrogation there is at least some form of responsibility or
involvement attributable to the government. As the Miranda Court noted, a
suspect in custody is subject to “inherently compelling pressures.”147 A
suspect in custody is presumably fearful of the restrictions placed on his
liberty at that precise moment, while the fear of indefinite incarceration
looms. However, this omnipresent coercive pressure is not, in and of itself,
sufficient to justify the exclusion of statements and confessions obtained.
After the police have informed a suspect of his Miranda rights, something
more compulsory is necessary to justify exclusion under both the voluntary
and the knowing and intelligent prongs. Thus, police conduct that is coercive
in nature and overbears the suspect’s will invokes the need for constitutional

145
State Action (Governmental Actor or State Actor), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen
Michael Sheppard ed. 2012).
146
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“Our ‘involuntary confession’
jurisprudence is entirely consistent with the settled law requiring some sort of ‘state action’
to support a claim of violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
see United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 58 (1883) (“Whoever, by virtue of public position
under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty without due process
of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional
inhibition; and, as he acts under the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's
power, his act is that of the State.”).
147
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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protection, thereby limiting the bounds by which testimony from a
vulnerable suspect can be admitted as evidence.148
Because the police serve as the executors of laws enacted by Congress or
other legislatures, police action that infringes upon a right afforded to a
suspect implicates a constitutional analysis. Thus, the verb “coerce”
necessarily invokes the Constitution’s protection.149 The Constitution’s
protection is justified because a suspect is able to point to a specific instance
of police conduct that overbore the suspect’s will and compelled him to
provide statements of culpability.
However, in Ted’s case, what can he point to as an act of the state that
compelled his outburst confession? The same rationale for invoking
constitutional protection for claims of involuntariness cannot justifiably be
applied to the psychological forces of a suspect’s mind. A suspect suffering
under psychotic duress, yet appearing objectively capable of understanding,
has no source to which he can attribute state action. Provided there is no
coercive misconduct, the psychological forces of the suspect’s mind are not
the responsibility of the police, and due to neurological complexities,
inferences attributing the suspect’s psychological forces to benign police
conduct are untenable: “Absent police conduct causally related to the
confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has
deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.”150
Additionally, the Connelly Court recognized, almost with disdain, that the
Constitution was ill-equipped to afford protection to suspects whose
psychological forces motivated them to speak: “Indeed, the Fifth
Amendment privilege is not concerned ‘with moral and psychological
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’”151
The Court established that “settled law” for a violation of due process claim
is necessitated by some form of state action.152 In the context of a suspect’s
ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights, where is this
state action? In short, it is absent.
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The Courts

The absence of justification for invoking constitutional protection in the
absence of police coercion should not discourage those seeking what they
deem to be fundamentally fair in this area of the law. Suspects alleging invalid
waivers due to psychosis still maintain the ability to attribute state action to
the trial judge.153 Dissenting in Connelly, Justice Brennan articulated that
coercion was not limited to presenting itself only in the custodial
interrogation context:
This Court abandons this precedent in favor of the view
that only confessions rendered involuntary by some state
action are inadmissible, and that the only relevant form of
state action is police conduct. But even if state action is
required, police overreaching is not its only relevant
form. . . . “[T]he due process clause requires ‘that state
action, whether through one agency or another, shall be
consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.”154
As abstract as the principles of “liberty” and “justice” are, their breadth is
sufficient to encompass any evidence unjustly admitted by a trial judge in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
In the absence of police coercion, when a trial judge is presented with
evidence of a suspect’s inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, yet
admits the evidence, this would necessarily be coercive action of the state
through the judiciary. This is so, even in the event that defense counsel fails
to raise an objection after admission of the tainted evidence.155 Put another
way:
Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and
using such confessions so coerced from them against them
in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief
iniquity, the crowning infamy of the Star Chamber, and the
inquisition, and other similar institutions. The Constitution
recognized the evils that lay behind these practices and
prohibited them in this country. And while it is true that
153
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ordinarily the competency of a confession must be raised
when the evidence is introduced, there are exceptions to that
rule . . .156
This “second layer” of procedural protection for a suspect in a jurisdiction
like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits who otherwise would unsuccessfully claim
his waiver was invalid, allows for additional challenges to the admission of
evidence.157
3.

Conclusion

While the Constitution protects individuals from the infringements of
those who by oath or affirmation swear to defend it, it is incapable of
protecting an individual from himself.158 Even if a concoction of a persuasive
argument is otherwise possible, the Court has already acknowledged the
unquantifiable difficulty that would accompany an inquiry into a suspect’s
mind.159 Thus, absent any police coercion, if the suspect “understands the
Miranda warnings yet is moved by a crazy impulse to blurt out a confession,
the confession is admissible.”160 As evidenced by the flawed reasoning of the
Colorado state courts in Connelly, there must be an “essential link between
coercive activity of the State” and the testimonial evidence proffered in order
to invoke protection under the Constitution.161 Because the knowing and
intelligent prong refers to a suspect’s cognitive ability to understand and
make rational decisions, the prong lacks the capability of infringement by a
force external to the suspect. Therefore, in looking to the Constitution for
support in excluding Ted’s statements, the meat is lacking.
C.

Looking to Precedent: Miranda and Good Faith

After looking to the Constitution for answers, there are two deducible
conclusions. First, the Constitution does not protect an individual from
himself, only from state action; thus, there is no constitutional support. Or,
second, despite the absence of any constitutional support for the proposition,
156
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a prophylactic extension could be implemented to offer more protection to
this vulnerable class of suspects. While the utility of the second conclusion is
admirable, the Court is perpetually hesitant to extend these sorts of
prophylactic constitutional protections.162 Thus, courts must look next to the
purpose and rationale underlying the Miranda doctrine for support.
1.

Miranda: What is the Purpose?

After concluding that the text and structure of the Constitution alone fail
to provide justification for the exclusion of Ted’s statements, the next step of
inquiry requires looking to Miranda and its prevailing doctrine. At the time
the decision was rendered, the rationale for Miranda was rooted in the
Court’s efforts to deter police interrogation practices that were harmful to the
criminal justice system, which were largely in tune with the growing Civil
Rights Movement of the era.163 In addition to this justification, the Court
subsequently stated that “[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an
accused is advised of and understands the right to remain silent and the right
to counsel.”164
These purposes are not mutually exclusive, however; as in Ted’s case, there
is no definite point at which the government can state with absolute certainty
that a suspect “understands” his right. All police can and must do is ensure
that the suspect is advised of his rights and, before proceeding to interrogate,
objectively determine that the suspect is capable of understanding such
rights. When an officer’s good faith determination is not entirely accurate,
however, what purpose is served by exclusion of the evidence? Arguably, the
government has taken the appropriate and necessary measures to ensure that
the suspect is advised of and understands his rights. Thus, there appears to
be no state action to deter and therefore no justification for the exclusion of
such evidence.
In support of this proposition, the Court ruled that the intentional
withholding by police of information potentially beneficial to a suspect’s
interrogation does not bear on whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent:
“Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend
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and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”165 In Moran, this “event”
was the diligent efforts of the suspect’s sister to provide her brother counsel
at the time of his interrogation.166 The Supreme Court unsympathetically
declined to attribute any relevance to the validity of a waiver merely from the
suspect’s lack of knowledge of events occurring outside of his presence:
[T]he same defendant, armed with the same information
and confronted with precisely the same police conduct,
would have knowingly waived his Miranda rights had a
lawyer not telephoned the police station to inquire about his
status. Nothing in any of our waiver decisions or in our
understanding of the essential components of a valid waiver
requires so incongruous a result. No doubt the additional
information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps
even it might have affected his decision to confess. But we
have never read the Constitution to require that the police
supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him
calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or
stand by his rights.167
Here, neither Ted nor Officer Sue were aware of his potentiality for psychotic
diagnosis. Regardless of whatever psychological forces may or may not have
been in operation at the time of waiver, it is likely that they would constitute
an “event” under Moran. Unlike Moran, however, this event is internal, not
external, to the suspect. Yet, one would be hard pressed to state that
psychological forces causing a psychotic episode do not bear on a suspect’s
ability to comprehend the warnings.
The fact that this “event” is occurring outside of the presence of the suspect
and is entirely unknown to him is significant. Aligned with the reasoning in
Moran, it is arguable that Ted’s ignorance to the neurological chemical
imbalance of his brain should not be considered in determining the validity
of his waiver. Additionally, in Moran, the police were aware of the suspect’s
attorney’s efforts to reach him; in Ted’s case, however, Officer Sue had as
much knowledge of Ted’s psychological condition as he did. Neither party is
at fault for not knowing the precise timing of a peculiar psychological
episode, so what justifies attributing fault to the police?
Whether or not this is considered an event is the penultimate question to
determine whether this was an event attributable to state action. In the
165
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absence of coercion, it is untenable to allege routine police interrogation
methods were the sufficient cause of a psychotic episode. However, if the
police’s conduct was of such a nature as to have overborne the defendant’s
will, a waiver will be invalidated due to its involuntariness. If the police’s
conduct does not rise to this threshold, is it fair to attribute its acts of due
diligence to a remote psychological force equally unknown to the police and
the suspect? Even if a psychotic episode constituted an “event,” there is sparse
legal authority to determine if that type of event would abrogate the Moran
decision, and state action is still the missing “essential link” to a claim of
protection under the Constitution.
Looking to the purposes of Miranda, there is no indicia of support that the
Constitution protects individuals from themselves. This should not be
viewed as a detriment to those cognitively impaired suspects in a custodial
interrogation setting. Instances where a suspect’s ability to comprehend
would be considered are not mutually exclusive of the voluntary question.
That is, an unknowing and unintelligent waiver is largely a product of
coercion at the root, not a result of the suspect’s mental ability alone.
2.

Miranda Implies Good Faith

Currently, the Court has created two exceptions that allow a suspect’s
statements to be admitted at trial despite the police’s failure to provide the
required Miranda safeguards: the impeachment use exception and public
safety exception.168 The first exception endorsed by the Court allows
otherwise inadmissible statements to be admitted for the limited purpose of
impeaching the credibility of a defendant’s testimony given on direct
examination.169 Under the second exception—the public safety exception—
the police’s failure to give Miranda warnings will not bar the suspect’s
subsequent statements from being admitted into evidence if, at the time of
the interrogation, the police’s failure to provide the warnings was the result
of being “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”170
To protect both the state’s interest in legitimate law enforcement and the
suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination, it is reasonable at this point in
the Court’s Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence to create a third
Miranda exception: a good faith exception to the knowing and intelligent
prong. The Court has alluded to the possibility of a good faith exception
under Miranda, yet it has failed to specifically address the exception in the
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context of the knowing and intelligent prong.171 In fact, the two judicially
permissible exceptions to Miranda allow evidence to be admitted in the
absence of providing the procedural warnings for the limited purpose of
impeachment or public safety. But how should the Court handle instances
where the government has complied with all the procedural safeguards and
has done its due diligence in interrogating a suspect in comport with the
Constitution?
In Michigan v. Tucker, the Court held that it was inappropriate to exclude
evidence obtained pre-Miranda which violated the safeguards provided
therein.172 Police informed the suspect, Thomas Tucker, that he had the right
to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and asked
if he would like an attorney present, to which he answered in the negative.173
However, the police failed to inform Tucker that counsel would be appointed
for him if he could not afford one.174 Tucker’s statements were then used to
locate a witness, whose testimony the prosecution sought to introduce at
trial.175
The Court declined to exclude the evidence on the basis of the police’s
failure to comport with Miranda’s subsequent procedural safeguards.176
Rather, the Court looked to historical circumstances underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination to determine whether the privilege against selfincrimination was so infringed as to justify exclusion.177 In doing so, the
Court distinguished between a violation of the privilege against selfincrimination and violations of “only the prophylactic rules developed to
protect that right.”178 Ultimately, the Court determined as a “question of
principle” that the evidence was admissible.179
In justifying its decision, the Court stated: “Just as the law does not require
that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically
require that policeman investigating serious crimes make no errors
whatsoever.”180 The Court reasoned that the purpose of exclusion under the
Fifth Amendment, like under the Fourth Amendment, is to deter abusive
171
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police practices that stand contrary to the Court’s and Constitution’s
mandates.181 Implicitly, the Court has recognized that inadvertent police
error occurs regularly. Post-Miranda, a policeman’s failure to provide all the
necessary warnings is a per se bar to the admission of the resulting evidence,
subject to exceptions.182 However, should the same bar be placed on evidence
obtained due to an officer’s failure to discern psychological forces
undetectable to the human eye? Such a result is inapposite to the deterrence
principle surrounding Miranda.
A corollary benefit of extending a good faith exception is that the analysis
of the voluntary prong remains unaffected. The exception would never apply
to the voluntary prong, primarily because any act of police coercion would
necessarily be in bad faith. However, under the knowing and intelligent
prong, its applicability is particularly relevant:
An officer might lack “subjective” fault—his neglect of the
safeguards might not be intentional or even reckless. An
officer might even lack “objective” fault—it might be
reasonable to believe that he is complying with the
guidelines. . . . An officer, for example, might reasonably
believe that he has demonstrated adequate respect for a
suspect’s assertion of the right to remain silent or that a
suspect’s conduct following a clear request for counsel’s
assistance has demonstrated a change of heart and a desire
to answer questions without assistance.183
This again begs the question: what purpose would there be in excluding
evidence that results from the suspect later spewing inculpatory statements?
Using Miranda’s deterrent purpose as a guidepost, suppression of
custodial statements taken in violation of Miranda is denied “when
countervailing interests outweigh the risks of constitutional deprivation and
when suppression would yield excessive prophylaxis.”184 Exclusion of such
evidence is “unjustified when the reach of the Miranda bar would be too
broad, violating the general requirement of a ‘close fit’ between prophylactic
rules and the core rights they protect.”185 The concern of excessive
181
Id. (“‘The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the
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prophylaxis is present if the Court were to adopt the position taken by most
scholars pertaining to the knowing and intelligent requirement. The delving
inquiry that would be required of police to determine whether suspects have
the requisite mental capacity to waive their rights before beginning an
interrogation would prove to be a wasteful allocation of time and resources.
The deterrent rationale of Miranda is equally present in the rationale for
the exclusionary rule:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very
least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of
some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result
of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a
greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where
the official action was pursued in complete good faith,
however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.186
This deterrent principle is similarly employed in handling the exclusion of
evidence under violations of the Fourth Amendment.187 The Court’s creation
and reliance on constitutional exclusionary rules begs the question: what is
the rationale for excluding statements made by an individual who cannot
make a knowing and intelligent waiver when the officer receiving such
statements acts in good faith compliance with the mandates of Miranda?
In Connelly, the Court emphasized that the evidence of a suspect’s mental
condition alone is insufficient to render a confession involuntary.188 It would
be similarly imprudent if the Court were to hold that evidence of a suspect’s
mental condition alone is enough to render a waiver unknowing and
unintelligent. Outside of the legal context, this reasoning seems flawed.
However, because the validity of a waiver is analyzed under the totality of the
circumstances, the suspect’s mental condition may not serve as the sole
justification for exclusion. This is particularly true when such a claim of
mental impairment, as in Ted’s case, can only be supported by post-hoc
psychological evaluation.
While the Court has not implied that good faith excuses a failure to
administer Miranda warnings, it certainly has implied that good faith may
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excuse subsequent revelation of a suspect’s inability to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver.
D.

Is this Fundamentally Unfair? No.

Critics of the Connelly decision have long argued about how decisions
like Rice and Garner will inevitably produce an inequitable justice system
for cognitively impaired suspects. This section serves to assuage those critics
by elaborating on the first sentence of this Comment: Pragmatism is the key
to Miranda. A consensus among inferior federal and state courts that, in the
absence of police coercion or bad faith, a waiver is presumed valid, will
serve legitimate state interests, while still protecting individual liberties.
1.

If the Police Should Have Known, Then the Waiver is
Invalid

What is to prevent an investigating officer from claiming that the suspect
appeared lucid and capable of understanding, when, in reality, she did not?
This is probably the first question that comes to mind when considering an
extension of the good faith exception to the knowing and intelligent prong.
Obviously, this should be at the forefront of concerns for cognitively
impaired suspects subject to interrogation. As a side note, promotion of the
value of video recorded interrogations would equally serve to protect this
interest. However, even in those cases where the suspect is not afforded the
luxury of a videotaped interrogation, the suspect is no worse off.
This is evidenced by Moore v. Ballone, where a chronic schizophrenic was
subjected to forty-five minutes of interrogation in relation to the rape and
murder of an eighty-eight-year-old woman.189 Evidence of the suspect’s
mental incapacity was apparent and recognizable, based in part on his
continual inquiry as to when his mother would pick him up, as well as
incomplete sentences such as “I go home.”190 The court held that the suspect’s
mental history precluded his ability to make a knowing and intelligent
waiver.191 The court reasoned that the suspect’s “understanding and
coherence should have been doubted by the officers during the
interrogation.”192 Moreover, all psychological evaluations revealed that the
suspect suffered from chronic schizophrenia.193
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But in the absence of police coercion under this Comment’s proposal, does
this evidence have any weight? The answer is yes. Even for courts that will
search for some form of police coercion before deeming a waiver invalid, this
type of evidence provides such. These types of statements may be suppressed
by reason of involuntariness, as the Court has stated that a confession “must
not be extracted by any sort of threat or violence, or obtained by any direct
or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any other
improper influence.”194 While the court in Moore failed to state so explicitly,
the police’s continual questioning of Moore with objective awareness of his
inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver is such an improper
influence. With awareness of his mental defect, not to precision but enough
to objectively determine a suspect is incapable of making a knowing and
intelligent waiver, the influence exerted on the suspect in this case would
equally serve to invalidate a waiver as involuntary. Thus, because post-hoc
psychological analysis is not precluded, the absence of express coercive police
conduct does not practically preclude a suspect from suppressing evidence of
culpability in the form of statements or confessions proffered while suffering
under psychotic episode.
Therefore, contrary to the Connelly decision’s articulation that the
privilege against self-incrimination is not concerned with the psychological
forces of the suspect, if those forces were present, and the evidence proffered
by the defendant is sufficient to show that the police should have known of
the suspect’s mental ability, the suspect is equally capable of vindicating
themselves from wrongful conviction.
2.

Totality of Circumstances is Still Considered

In evaluating a suspect’s mental capacity under the totality of the
circumstances test, a court is not required to detect the presence of a mental
impairment, but rather, to look to the characteristics of the defendant to
determine the degree to which he understood and appreciated the
significance of waiving those rights.195 The ultimate test is whether a suspect’s
characteristics—age, background, experience, and intelligence—display a
clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.196 Thus, a suspect suffering
under a psychotic episode at the time of interrogation is likely to display all
194
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of these characteristics consistent with a person of normal cognitive abilities.
This is the difficulty that was encountered by Judge Posner in Rice, and with
only post-hoc psychological analysis available to support a defendant’s
contention that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent, the state’s
interest in legitimate law enforcement should control. As the court in Garner
articulated, “[t]he underlying police-regulatory purpose of Miranda compels
that these circumstances be examined, in their totality, primarily from the
perspective of the police.”197
In Blackburn v. Alabama, the Court held that the admission of Blackburn’s
confession into evidence at trial “transgressed the imperatives of
fundamental justice.”198 While the Court’s holding was in relation to the
“voluntary” standard under the Due Process Clause, its comments and
rationale pertaining to Blackburn’s mental condition are noteworthy. The
Court acknowledged that there is undeniably a legitimate and necessary
government interest in convicting criminals, but that, above all, “there are
considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence.”199
Particularly, the Court noted that, notwithstanding whether the confession
by Blackburn was true or false, “the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
‘fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.’”200
The significance of the Court’s decision in Blackburn, which to an
extent was abrogated by its later decision in Connelly, is that mental illness is
a factor that will almost always be taken into consideration when
constitutional rights are jeopardized. Another significant factor of the
Court’s decision is its acknowledgment that the contours of determining a
suspect’s mental ability are not easily discernable and that a judgment on that
front is always, by its nature, one of probabilities.201
While the primary inquiry into a waiver’s validity should focus on what
the police were able to discern from the suspect’s manifestations, this does
not altogether prevent the suspect from bringing in evidence of cognitive
impairment to support a motion to suppress.202 Even in Ted’s case, where
police coercion is absent, the knowing and intelligent prong, like the
voluntary prong, is considered under a totality of the circumstances
197

Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir. 2009).
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 211 (1960).
199
Id. at 206.
200
Id. (quoting Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
201
Id. at 208.
202
Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f it turns out by subsequent
inquiry that a defendant in his mind could not actually understand the warnings, the finder
of fact may be more inclined to determine in a close case that the police should have known
that the defendant could not understand.”).
198

2021]

Waiving Miranda

369

approach.203 The great weight of scholarship on the subject has apparently
forgotten that this exists. Even in cases like Rice and Garner, subject to
criticism for using the absence of police coercion as a rationale in reaching
their holding, these courts still considered the evidence of each suspect’s
respective mental impairment. It is not as if the moment a court finds that
police coercion is absent, it should proceed further without inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the waiver. Again, any impact that police may
have on a suspect’s knowledge or intelligence in electing to waive Miranda
rights would necessarily amount to coercion, thus invalidating a waiver as
involuntary, rather than unknowing and unintelligent.
3.

The Crime Must Still Be Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

A substantial concern for suspects suffering under psychosis at the time of
statements made in custody is that the statements or confessions will be false.
While it cannot be stated to a degree of scientific accuracy, a suspect’s
inability to know what he is saying at the time he is in custody could very
much lead to a false confession or statement.204 Ultimately, if the government
is unable to proffer any additional inculpatory evidence corroborating the
defendant’s statements in custody, the likelihood of conviction is
significantly diminished.
However, the government is not at odds with securing convictions or
pursuing legitimate law enforcement. In the event that a defendant alleges
the invalidity of his waiver, the government is not precluded from seeking
and admitting additional evidence to prove the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.205 Both the suspect’s individual rights and the government’s interest
in securing convictions and legitimate law enforcement are equally served
under this proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
In determining whether a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently in
the absence of police coercion, an interpretation of Connelly that is more
aligned with Rice and Gardner provides the most sound law. While the law
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has progressively allocated additional rights to those who are cognitively
impaired, there is no constitutional protection from the psychological forces
of a suspect’s mind. The expense of judicial inquiry would be overbearing
and untenable, and the purpose of Miranda and its derivative doctrine has
consistently been aimed at curbing coercive police misconduct in the
custodial interrogation setting. Yet, suspects falling within this class are still
afforded procedural safeguards. “Of the contention that the law provides no
effective remedy for such a deprivation of rights affecting life and liberty, it
may well be said . . . that it ‘falls with the premise.’”206
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